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Abstract
Purpose – Collaborative consumption, such as car sharing, speciﬁcally implicates customer-to-customer interaction, which must be regulated by
service providers (companies, peers and self-regulating communities), comprising different challenges for business organizations. While in
conventional business relations, consumers are protected from undesirable customer behavior by laws, regulations (power) in the context of
collaborative consumption are rare, so that trust becomes more relevant. It is the purpose of the study to investigate possible mechanisms to
prevent undesirable customers in collaborative consumption.
Design/methodology/approach – In between subject designs, samples of 186 and 328 consumers ﬁlled in experimental online questionnaires
with vignettes. Analyses were made of differences among car sharing companies, private persons and car sharing communities in terms of the
power of providers, trust in providers and trust in other users of the shared goods, undesirable customer behavior and consumer–provider relations.
Findings – Companies, private persons and self-regulating communities differ in terms of perceived power and trust. Participants speciﬁcally
perceive mainly coercive power with the car sharing company, but with the private person and the community, reason-based trust in other users is
perceived as prevalent. Nevertheless, undesirable customer behavior varies only marginally over the models.
Originality/value – The present study is the ﬁrst to investigate measures to prevent undesirable customer behavior over different collaborative
consumption models. This enables appropriate identiﬁcation of market segments and tailoring of services. The study identiﬁes opportunities for
companies in contrast to private persons and self-regulating communities and, in doing so, provides important stimulation for marketing strategy
and theory development.
Keywords Trust, Power, Cooperation, Customer-to-customer interaction, Collaborative consumption, Undesirable customer
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Triggered by the economic crisis and increased environmental
awareness, consumers are increasingly engaging in
collaborative consumption (Tussyadiah, 2015). In
collaborative consumption, access to a good rather than
ownership is of relevance (Belk, 2014; Botsman and Rogers,
2010; Leismann et al., 2013). Consumers share goods via car
sharing companies (Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012), toy lending
libraries (Ozanne and Ozanne, 2011), and many other services,
such as tool lending workshops and community gardens,
owning neither the cars nor the toys or tools or jointly grown
vegetables, but instead, having access to them. Customer-to-
customer interactions (Martin and Pranter, 1989) are key in
such service environments. With collaborative consumption,
consumers’ (dis-)satisfaction is a reﬂection of not only the
service provided but also the interaction with fellow customers.
Dissatisfaction can arise easily when fellow customers treat
shared goods inappropriately and return them in a state
whereby they are unusable for other customers. Collaborate
consumption providersmust therefore limit the number of such
“undesired customers” (Harris and Reynolds, 2004), whereby
different forms of collaborative consumption have different
strategies to achieve this.
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Due to the popularity of collaborative consumption, the supply
of collaborative consumption services is not restricted to
conventional business-to-consumer models. Increasingly,
consumer networks are created to share resources, providing new
challenges for the market. It is possible to distinguish between
different providers, i.e. businesses vs consumers (Möhlmann,
2015), and different market orientations, i.e. providers operating
for proﬁt and non-proﬁt (Schor and Fritzmaurice, 2015). There
are very different types of collaborative consumption, for
instance, business-to-consumer (Cohen and Kietzmann, 2014;
Lamberton and Rose, 2012), peer-to-consumer (Cohen and
Kietzmann, 2014) and self-regulating communities (Cohen and
Kietzmann, 2014; Ozanne and Ballantine, 2010). With the ﬁrst
type, professional service providers proﬁt from collaborative
consumption and fully manage the organization and also assume
legal liability. With the latter types, providers are single peers or
communities of consumers that operate on a non-proﬁt basis,
and the peers and the communities themselves are the organizing
providers, who are, however, for the most part, without legal
regulation (Owyang et al., 2013; Schor and Fritzmaurice, 2015).
These forms differ, e.g. in ways of preventing undesirable
customers from interacting with fellow users, i.e. the ability to
punish misbehavior or to reward virtuous conduct. They
additionally differ in terms of consumers’ trust in the provider
and in fellow users of the collaborative good.While trust between
marketers and consumers is important inmost business relations,
for collaborative consumption, the trust of consumers in other
users of the collaborative services or goods is also essential
(Bhattacherjee, 2002;Melnik and Alm, 2002; Möhlmann, 2015;
Sangmi et al., 2011).
To investigate possible mechanisms to prevent undesirable
customers, the paper draws from the slippery slope framework,
a concept from governance research in which cooperative
behavior is predicted by power (punishment, reward,
legitimacy) and trust (Gangl et al., 2015). This approach allows
a differentiated understanding of the consumer–provider
relationship, which is an important determinant of business
success (Coulter and Coulter, 2002; Dwyer et al., 1987;Mason
and Simmons, 2012).
The current research investigates:
 whether the three forms of collaborative consumption differ
in terms of the extent of undesirable customer behavior;
 how they vary in terms of the providers’ power and the
trust in these providers and in other users to prevent
undesirable customer behavior;
 the prevailing interaction climates between providers and
consumers; and
 the reasons for consumers’ decisions to engage in a form
of collaborative consumption.
This research contributes to the existing service literature by
investigating a new and speciﬁc form of customer-to-customer
interaction, i.e. collaborative consumption whereby customer
satisfaction rests heavily on fellow customers. The treatment of
undesirable customers differs depending on the speciﬁc form of
collaborative consumption. In a business-to-consumer context,
the number of undesirable customers can be kept to a minimum
by wielding power. In a peer-to-consumer context and self-
regulating communities, this is achieved by establishing trust.
Furthermore, as trust is a very important aspect in service
marketing (Kharouf et al., 2014) and especially in the
collaborative consumption context (Möhlmann, 2015), we
distinguish between trust in providers of services and in other
users of these services, an aspect that has been neglected in
research thus far. We apply two vignette-based, experimental
online questionnaires to investigate differences between the three
collaborative consumption models. Recommendations for
businesses, e.g. car sharing companies, and other collaborative
consumption forms are discussed. Moreover, with this research
we provide a solid basis for the organization and regulation of
collaborative consumption (Koopman et al., 2014; Rauch and
Schleicher, 2015).
Conceptual foundations
Mobility services
The area of mobility is among the ﬁrst where organizations and
companies have offered services that enable the shift from
ownership to temporary access (Prettenthaler and Steininger,
1999), so-called “car sharing services”[1]. Car sharing represents
a very successful example of collaborative consumption, and over
the past decades has grown considerably in North America and
Europe. In line with Katzev (2003), we deﬁne car sharing as a
service that enables a group of individuals to share a ﬂeet of cars
with other members. Providers of car sharing services differ
widely in their objectives, business models, technology (offering
online platforms or mobile-app based services) and target
markets (Millard-Ball, 2005).
Consumers can choose between different forms of
collaborative consumption, for instance, when sharing a car,
they can use a company’s service (business-to-consumer;
Cohen and Kietzmann, 2014; Lamberton and Rose, 2012),
share a car with a peer (peer-to-consumer; Cohen and
Kietzmann, 2014), or share with neighbors (self-regulating
communities; Cohen and Kietzmann, 2014; Ozanne and
Ballantine, 2010). In the current studies, we focus on car
sharing services that share the following features:
 a provider enables members access to a car for their own
use;
 users book the cars in advance;
 users ﬁnd the cars located close to their home, workplace
or public transport stations;
 they access the cars on their own; and
 they rent them for a limited period.
This deﬁnition covers different types of providers, such as
companies (e.g. Zipcar, Car2Go, or Drive Now), private
persons and communities (Figure 1). In contrast, excluded
from the deﬁnition is the shared use of vehicles in arrangements
such as carpooling[2], ride-sharing services or taxi services like
Uber or Lyft (Wallsten, 2015). The relationship with fellow
customers in car sharing services differs distinctly from those in
ride-sharing services: Users have to rely on one another to bring
back the cars promptly, clean and undamaged. This raises the
problem that customers may interact with a communal good in
their own self-interest (Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012).
Undesirable customers as component of consumer
(dis-)satisfaction
With services such as collaborative consumption, customer-to-
customer interaction, in particular, comes into focus. With
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invariant service, such interaction can result in satisfaction or
dissatisfaction depending on the quality of the interaction
(Martin and Pranter, 1989). Dissatisfaction can stem from so-
called undesirable customers, i.e. customers whose actions
make the services for fellow customers unpleasant or impossible
(Harris and Reynolds, 2004; Nicholls, 2010). Research on
undesirable customers is rare (Nicholls, 2010); neither their
impact on consumer (dis-)satisfaction nor how to prevent them
has been sufﬁciently investigated. Although undesirable
customers seldom disturb fellow customers’ services, they are
of great importance and signiﬁcance because they are certainly
shaping (dis-)satisfaction with the service (Nicholls, 2010).
To our knowledge, only Harris and Reynolds (2004) have
conducted research on undesirable customers. They
investigated the kinds of jaycustomers employees and
customers perceive, i.e. customers who intentionally behave in
a way so that their behavior is unpleasant for companies,
employees and customers, whereby one kind are undesirable
customers. The behavior of undesirable customers ranges from
repulsive to criminal conduct. We also categorize as
undesirable customers, persons who interrupt fellow
customers’ services (Harris and Reynolds, 2004; Nicholls,
2010) due to their inappropriate handling of a shared good
rendering it unusable for a fellow customer, or usable only at a
later time.
Slippery slope framework
We apply the slippery slope framework (Gangl et al., 2015), a
model that determines cooperative behavior based on power
and trust, to demonstrate the prevention of undesirable
customers (Figure 2). Although the slippery slope framework
was developed in the context of governance theory and
originally was based on tax behavior (Hofmann et al., 2014), it
captures the relation of any organization and an individual. The
slippery slope framework has already been applied to other
contexts, e.g. to explain the relation of an insurance company
and its customer (Hofmann et al., 2017). The framework
considers trust and power as drivers of cooperative behavior.
Trust has been widely recognized as an important factor in
marketing (Coulter and Coulter, 2002; Geyskens et al., 1998)
and especially in collaborative consumption (Hamari et al.,
2015; Hartl et al., 2016; Möhlmann, 2015). Although recent
studies on collaborative consumption underline the importance
of power in terms of governance (Hartl et al., 2016), there is a
lack of empirical evidence on its impact on cooperation in the
sharing economy. As such the slippery slope framework seems
speciﬁcally appropriate to explain collaborative consumption
behavior.
The slippery slope framework postulates that there are
different qualities of provider power, such as coercive power
and legitimate power. Coercive power comprises negative and
positive re-enforcers, i.e. punishment for uncooperative
behavior and reward for cooperative behavior. Legitimate
power summarizes measures of the providers with which they
inﬂuence behavior through legitimacy of their position, their
expertise, the form of information dissemination and the
potential to identify with them (Raven et al., 1998).
These qualities of power go hand in hand with different
qualities of trust in organizing providers and fellow users, i.e.
automatic and well considered trust, such as implicit and
reason-based trust. Implicit trust is characterized by an
automatic reaction. This reaction is either triggered by a cue or
has been learned from good experiences. Reason-based trust
develops after some considerations. Individuals trust another
party, if they ﬁnd that this party pursues similar goals, acts
benevolently and with motivation, has the competence to
achieve the goals and is supported but not hindered by third,
external parties (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Kharouf
et al., 2014).
Power and trust generate speciﬁc interaction climates
between providers and consumers. We differentiate an
antagonistic climate produced by coercive power, a service
climate generated by legitimate power and reason-based trust,
and a conﬁdence climate created by implicit trust (Gangl et al.,
2015). The antagonistic climate is characterized by distrust
between different actors. Authorities perceive individuals as
defecting and prosecute them, and respectively, individuals
hide and act uncooperatively when possible. A service climate
comprises a formal and well-organized relationship in which
authorities provide excellent service to make cooperative
behavior much easier for individuals than engaging in
defection. In the conﬁdence climate, there is mutual trust
between authorities and individuals. Both work for the beneﬁt
of the community and feel a moral obligation to cooperate. We
assume that business-to-consumer models and consumption
from self-regulating communities are related to different
interaction climates.
Perception of power in collaborative consumption
In business-to-consumer relations, a company is the organizing
provider. They are characterized by several measures to
Figure 2 Slippery slope framework
Figure 1 New mobility services by different forms and respective
examples
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determine consumers’ behavior. On the one hand, they can
sanction undesirable behavior and reward desirable behavior,
e.g. with cancelation fees (Brook, 2004), using positive and
negative reinforcement based on the theory of operant
conditioning (Skinner, 1948). On the other hand, companies
also offer support and services that make it easy for
consumers to cooperate (Jenny et al., 2007; Umit Kucuk and
Krishnamurthy, 2007). Through this, companies are
perceived as holding legitimacy and expertise, and as
representing an organization that one can identify with,
which inﬂuences consumers’ behavior. We assume that in
business-to-consumer relations, companies not only hold a
measure of coercive power, such as punishing undesirable
customer behavior, but also grant customers special rewards,
e.g. by handing out discounts. Additionally, they certainly
apply legitimate power, i.e. are in the position to wield power,
have the expertise in proﬁcient handling, hand out
information regarding conduct and are possibly an institution
to identify with based on the nature of goods and services as
well as marketing.
Peer-to-consumer exchanges exist in many different forms, but
based on their common features, we assume that they comprise
mostly legitimate power, as single providers are able to act more
ﬂexibly than formally and informally regulated exchanges.
They can offer more relevant expertise and information and can
represent a person by means of values with which one can
identify (Martin, 2016). They can still wield coercive power
because their legal ownership entitles them to do so.
Self-regulating communities are characterized by very little or
no power (Owyang et al., 2013). Without any appointed
provider, such as a company, there is no provider to actually
wield power, either coercive or legitimate. Because it lacks legal
regulation, the community as an indistinct provider does not
have measures to establish consumer behavior (Owyang et al.,
2013). There are neither binding forms of punishment for
misbehavior nor binding rewards, and therefore no coercive
power is wielded. Legitimate power, on the other hand, is
independent of legal rules; it could therefore be present in self-
regulating communities. Yet, as no appointed providers exist,
consumers cannot attribute legitimate power to a speciﬁc
person. Based on these assumptions, the following hypotheses
were developed:
H1a. In business-to-consumer relations, coercive power is
more prevalent than in peer-to-consumer exchanges
and in self-regulating communities.
H1b. In business-to-consumer relations and in peer-to-
consumer exchanges, legitimate power is more
prevalent than in self-regulating communities.
Perception of trust in the provider in collaborative
consumption
In business-to-consumer relations, trust in providers is an
important characteristic of good business relations and a
predictor of satisfaction with the relationship (Möhlmann,
2015; Papadopoulou et al., 2001; Pennington et al.,2003). We
assume that in such business relations, consumers have reason-
based trust in the company. The providers’ legitimate power,
i.e. expertise, information, etc., offers some basis for trust
(Umit Kucuk and Krishnamurthy, 2007). Trust does not
originate solely from an elaborate decision process and can be
triggered by simple cues, such as a company’s logo
(Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010); such automatic or implicit
trust can develop over time in long-term business-to-consumer
relations but is not common in short-term relations (Schor and
Fritzmaurice, 2015).
As peer-to-consumer exchanges are associated with legitimate
power, consumers have reason-based trust in the provider
(Gangl et al., 2015). In such exchanges, in some cases,
consumers do not personally know the provider who owns the
collaborative good (e.g. when the good is provided via an
internet platform), which speciﬁcally places trust at the center
of attention (Martin, 2016; Yu et al., 2004; Xiong and Liu,
2004; Wang and Vassileva, 2003). By pondering the
advantages and disadvantages of this relationship, consumers
ﬁndmany reasons on which to base their trust. Provider ratings
on the internet usually support the emergence of trust and are
helpful in bringing together compatible providers and
consumers (Martin, 2016). In cases where a relationship has
lasted for some time, the expectation is that implicit trust will
grow (Gangl et al., 2015). Thus, in a peer-to-consumer model,
reason-based trust and some implicit trust in the authorities can
be expected.
Based on the community’s self-regulating nature, relations
among people with similar interests and values should establish
reason-based trust in the communities, i.e. indistinct providers.
The non-existence of power in self-regulating communities, in
particular, provides an excellent environment for cultivating
implicit trust in the community (Schor and Fritzmaurice,
2015). It can be assumed that communities that do not wield
any type of power and, additionally, comprise consumers
holding very low implicit trust in the provider, will quickly
collapse (Owyang et al., 2013) because no force is present to
hold the community together. Based on this, the following two
hypotheses were developed:
H2a. In business-to-consumer relations and in peer-to-
consumer exchanges, reason-based trust in the
provider is more pronounced than in self-regulating
communities.
H2b. In self-regulating communities, implicit trust in the
provider is more pronounced than in business-to-
consumer relations and in peer-to-consumer
exchanges.
Perception of trust in other users in collaborative
consumption
In business-to-consumer relations, interactions between
consumers are limited, and the company acts as an
intermediary, regulating users’ reliabilities and rights to goods.
With this in mind, consumers have profound reason to trust in
other users, and therefore, reason-based trust in other users
should prevail. Nevertheless, over time and after several
positive experiences, reason-based-trust can change into
implicit trust (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010); thus, few but
some implicit trust in other users of the goods might exist in
business-to-consumer relations.
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With peer-to-consumer exchanges, several consumers use a
speciﬁc collaborative good from one owner, which implies
similarities in values and experiences between these consumers.
Such similarities function as cues, and these cues can be
expected to trigger implicit trust in other users (Bente et al.,
2008). In peer-to-consumer exchanges, trust in other users of
collaborative goods depends to a lesser extent on wielded
power. The peer is regulating the lending of the good
legitimately and therefore consumers should trust that fellow
users abide by the regulations. Thus, in peer-to-consumer
exchanges, implicit trust in other users of the good prevails, but
some reason-based trustmight also exist.
Based on the “sharing” nature of collaborative consumption
in self-regulating communities, we assume that consumers trust
not only in providers organizing collaborative consumption also
but more importantly, in other consumers using the same
services and goods (Bhattacherjee, 2002; Melnik and Alm,
2002; Möhlmann, 2015; Sangmi et al., 2011). Being part of
such a sharing group, sharing norms and values, certainly
provides reasons to trust other users (Schor and Fritzmaurice,
2015). Thus, in self-regulating communities, reason-based
trust in other users prevails. Additionally, the regularity of the
interaction with other users suggests that interpersonal
relationships of community members are long lasting, which
allows progress from reason-based trust to implicit trust (Gangl
et al., 2015; Schor and Fritzmaurice, 2015). Therefore, we
assume that consumers in self-regulating communities trust
other users; they hold reason-based trust and implicit trust,
leading to two hypotheses:
H3a. In self-regulating communities and in peer-to-
consumer exchanges, reason-based trust in the other
users is more pronounced than in business-to-
consumer relations.
H3b. In self-regulating communities and in peer-to-
consumer exchanges, implicit trust in other users is
more pronounced than in business-to-consumer
relations.
Perception of the consumer-provider relationship in
collaborative consumption
Regarding consumer-provider relations we focus on differences
between themost opposing forms of collaborative consumption
models, business-to-consumer models and self-regulating
communities (regulation vs no regulation).
In business-to-consumer relations, companies are expected to
offer good services to the consumers, and also have the power
to reward or punish consumers for their behavior. In this vein, a
professional relationship between the company and the
consumers is expected (Fu et al., 2013). Therefore, expected to
prevail is a service climate, which comprises a formal and well-
organized relationship, in which providers offer excellent
service to make cooperative behavior easier for individuals
(Gangl et al., 2015). Nevertheless, in some cases, companies
might be perceived as malevolent and persecute consumers
with sanctions in case of defection, and respectively, consumers
act uncooperatively when it is possible (Gangl et al., 2015). In
such rare cases, an antagonistic climate between the provider
and the consumers might prevail. Thus, in business-to-
consumer relations, it can be expected that consumers mainly
perceive a service climate, but some might also perceive an
antagonistic climate.
Self-regulating communities, on the other hand, do not have
measures at hand to sanction consumers’ behavior; existing
instead are mutual (implicit) trust among the members and a
conﬁdence climate. In such a climate, providers and consumers
work for the beneﬁt of the community and feel a moral
obligation to cooperate (research on taxpaying Alm and
Torgler, 2011; Gangl et al., 2015). Therefore, interactions in
communities take place mainly within a conﬁdence climate;
neither an antagonistic climate nor a service climate is relevant.
The following three hypotheses were formulated:
H4a. In business-to-consumer relations, the perception of an
antagonistic climate is more distinct than in self-
regulating communities.
H4b. In business-to-consumer relations, the perception of a
service climate is more distinct than in self-regulating
communities.
H4c. In self-regulating communities, the perception of a
conﬁdence climate is more distinct than in business-to-
consumer relations.
Undesirable customer behavior as uncooperative
behavior
All collaborative consumption models face the problem of
undesirable customer behavior. As earlier studies (Jiang and
Tian, 2015) have shown, consumers can exploit other users of
collaborative goods by returning them late or by not taking care
of the goods. We assume that the level of undesirable customer
behavior in all collaborative consumption models is similar and
that only the power and trust in the collaborative consumption
models differ. Consequently, the following hypothesis reads:
H5. The level of undesirable customer behavior is similar in
business-to-consumer relations, in peer-to-consumer
exchanges and in self-regulating communities.
In the following, we present two studies; the ﬁrst examines the
differences in handling undesirable customer behavior between
the two most divergent collaborative consumption models,
business-to-consumer model versus self-regulating community;
the second contrasts all three models, investigating additionally
a model that is organized between the other two (legally binding
rules). Study 2 not only conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Study 1, but
additionally presents a more realistic setting because
participants in the study can choose from the three options for
car sharing. Furthermore, Study 2 examines how the three
different providers and their services are perceived. In both
studies, we apply an experimental method gathering
quantitative and also qualitative data. The experimental
approach distinguishes the different kinds of collaborative
consumption and allows systematic insight in power
perceptions, trust and relations, whereas the qualitative data
enrich these results with justiﬁcations for the experimental
ﬁndings and reasons for the selection of speciﬁc forms of
collaborative consumption. Although other methods, such as
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interviews or focus groups, might produce similar data, solely
experiments help in distinguishing causal effects. Additionally,
we follow the suggestion of Ranjan et al. (2015) to use
experimental approaches for investigating the quality of service
interactions.
Study 1
Method
Participants
An online questionnaire was completed by a convenience
sample of 186 consumers (60.2 per cent women,Mage = 27.17
years, SDage = 10.27) recruited via personal contacts of
university members. The majority of participants (89.8 per
cent) earned less than 2,000 Euros per month.
Experimental design and procedure
Investigating the differences in power and trust over two
collaborative consumption models, participants were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions, in which either (a) a car
sharing company or (b) a housing community sharing a car was
described in an experimental vignette (Appendix). The
vignettes were constructed based on real companies and
communities. For the experimental design, the phrasing of the
different texts was very similar so that only keywords describing
service design (Goldstein et al., 2002; for differences in service
designs, see Tables AI and AII in Appendix) were different. We
therefore assured that differences in the dependent variables
could be attributed to the different forms of car sharing and not
the phrasing of the vignettes.
Depending on the condition, participants were meant to
imagine that they are using a car from either the car sharing
company or the housing community. After reading the
vignettes, all participants received the following information:
“You took the car for a ride on a weekend. You enjoyed the
trip so much, that you wanted to stay a day longer, but you
borrowed the car for just one day”.
Participants had to indicate intentional undesirable customer
behavior, i.e. “How likely is it that you would keep the car for
longer than agreed upon?” (seven-point Likert scale).
Subsequently, a series of adapted items (based on Hofmann
et al., 2014) followed. Participants had to ﬁll in a questionnaire
assessing their perception of coercive power (punishment: 3
items; reward: 3 items), legitimate power (8 items), implicit
trust in the provider (3 items), implicit trust in other users (3
items), reason-based trust in the provider (7 items) and reason-
based trust in other users (7 items). In addition, participants
answered scales on environmental consciousness (10 items)
and green consumerism (12 items; Alsmadi, 2007), risk-
seeking (6 items; Colquitt et al., 2006) and trustfulness (4
items, adapted from Cattell, 2001) collecting data on control
variables. Responses were indicated on a seven-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (“I totally disagree”) to 7 (“I totally
agree”). Following poor internal consistency (Cronbach a =
0.51) of coercive power we built two independent kinds of
power, i.e. coercive power comprising punishments and reward
power containing rewards. Cronbach’s a for the scales can be
found in Table I. Socio-demographics were likewise assessed.
Results
Power and trust
Testing whether the perception of power and trust differs over
collaborative consumption models, a MANOVA, including
control variables, revealed that respondents differ in their
answers depending on the two collaborative consumption
models (F(7, 174) = 13.35, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.35)[3].
Speciﬁcally, in line with H1a, coercive power is perceived as
held by the company (M = 4.77, SD = 1.39) rather than the
community (M = 2.98, SD = 1.47; F(1, 186) = 71.53, p <
0.001, h2p = 0.28). Contrary to H1a and H1b, the perception
of legitimate power (p = 0.23) and reward power (p = 0.22) is
equally high in bothmodels (Table I).
Concerning experienced trust, the analysis reveals that
reason-based trust in other users is signiﬁcantly higher when
collaborative consumption is organized by a community (M =
3.92, SD = 1.26) rather than a company (M = 3.47, SD = 1.35;
F(1, 186) = 6.19, p = 0.01, h2p = 0.03) supporting H3a.
Implicit trust in other users (p = 0.09) and implicit trust (p =
0.65), as well as reason-based trust (p = 0.66), in the provider is
equally high in both models contradicting H3a, H2a and H2b
(Table I).
Consumer–provider relationship
Concerning the research question whether the perception of
climates differs according to the models, a MANOVA
including control variables reveals that respondents differ in
their answers depending on the two collaborative consumption
models (F(3, 186) = 26.48, p< 0.001, h2p= 0.31).
Regarding the perception of a service climate, the analysis
showed that, as expected (H4b), participants reported higher
levels of a service climate (F(1, 186) = 63.97, p < 0.001, h2p =
0.26), when consumption is organized by a company (M =
Table I Means over company and community conditions and respective
Cronbach’s a
Company Community
N 98 88
Scales a M (SD) M (SD)
Coercive power 0.81 4.77 (1.39) 2.98 (1.47)
Reward power 0.67 3.57 (1.35) 3.82 (1.29)
Legitimate power 0.74 4.99 (0.88) 4.79 (1.01)
Reason-based trust – provider 0.79 4.16 (1.12) 4.21 (1.34)
Implicit trust – provider 0.85 3.78 (1.67) 3.95 (1.55)
Reason-based trust – users 0.82 3.47 (1.35) 3.92 (1.26)
Implicit trust – users 0.86 3.38 (1.71) 3.83 (1.52)
Antagonistic climate 0.79 2.36 (1.39) 2.06 (1.08)
Service climate 0.66 5.37 (1.02) 3.94 (1.28)
Conﬁdence climate 0.85 4.83 (1.45) 5.52 (1.39)
Undesirable customer behavior 1.55 (1.52) 1.91 (1.67)
Control variables
Environmental consciousness 0.86 6.10 (0.71) 5.86 (1.02)
Green consumerism 0.93 4.44 (1.30) 4.20 (1.32)
Risk seeking 0.85 3.18 (1.40) 3.27 (1.24)
Trustfulness 0.87 4.25 (1.31) 4.44 (1.39)
Note: Means are not adjusted by control variables
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5.37, SD = 1.02) rather than a community (M = 3.94, SD =
1.28). Further, in accordance with H4c, the experience of a
conﬁdence climate is higher in the community (M= 5.52, SD=
1.39) than with the company (M = 4.83, SD = 1.45; F
(1, 186) = 13.71, p = 0.001, h2p = 0.07). Additionally, in the
company, the antagonistic climate is higher (M = 2.36, SD =
1.39) than in the community (M = 2.06, SD = 1.08, F
(1, 186) = 3.95, p= 0.05, h2p= 0.02, Table I) supportingH4a.
Undesirable customer behavior
To test whether undesirable customer behavior differs between
the models, an ANOVA with the dependent variable
undesirable customer behavior and including control variables
was conducted. As expected, H5 is supported and undesirable
customer behavior does not differ depending on the
collaborative consumption model (F(1, 186) = 1.45, p = 0.23,
h2p= 0.01, Table I).
Study 2
Method
Participants
A convenience sample of 328 consumers (53.4 per cent
women, Mage = 27.69 years, SDage = 10.07) completed an
online questionnaire. Most participants (82.9 per cent) earned
less than 2,000 euros per month.
Design and procedure
Participants had to imagine that they had moved house and
would need a car now and then. A vignette describes three
opportunities to use a car: They can use a car either (a) from a
car sharing company or (b) from a private person or (c) from a
housing community, which makes Study 2 a quasi-experiment.
The vignettes for the car sharing company and the self-
regulating community were similar to the ones in Study 1, again
basing on existing examples but with similar phrasing
(Appendix). The three vignettes were presented in a balanced
sequence among all participants. After having decided from
which provider to use the car (company, private person, self-
regulating community), participants were asked to openly state
what aspects led to their decision.
Similar to Study 1, participants should imagine that they are
using the mentioned car and that they would like to use it a day
longer than requested. Again, participants had to indicate
undesirable customer behavior (“How likely would you keep
the car longer than agreed upon?”; seven-point Likert scale).
Again, participants had to ﬁll in a questionnaire assessing the
same constructs as in Study 1. Cronbach’s a for the scales can
be found in Table II. Socio-demographics were also assessed.
Results
Power and trust
Testing whether the perception of power and trust differs over
collaborative consumption models, a MANOVA including
control variables revealed that respondents differ in their
answers depending on the three collaborative consumption
models (F(14, 632) = 11.16, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.20)[4]. As
expected, the perception of coercive power (F(2, 321) = 61.86,
p < 0.001, h2p = 0.28) and reward power (F(2, 321) = 5.31,
p = 0.01, h2p = 0.03) differs between the business models:
Coercive power is perceived with the company rather than with
the community or in a peer-to-consumer business model
supporting H1a (Table II). Likewise, the perception of reward
power is lower when a company rather than a peer or
community provides the service contradictingH1a. Contrary to
expectations (H1b), the perception of legitimate power (p =
0.11) is equally high in all models.
Concerning experienced trust, the analysis reveals that
reason-based trust in other users differs in the three models, F
(2, 321) = 16.86, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.10, supporting H3a.
When a company provides the service, trust in the other users is
signiﬁcantly lower thanwith a peer or a community (Table II).
Reason-based trust (p = 0.06) and implicit trust in the
provider (p = 0.28), as well as implicit trust in other users (p =
Table II Means over company, peer-to-consumer and community conditions and respective Cronbach’s a
Company Peer-to-consumer Community
N 121 102 105
Scales a M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Coercive power 0.86 4.57 (1.36) 2.82 (1.30) 2.78 (1.45)
Reward power 0.68 3.78 (1.42) 4.28 (1.35) 4.32 (1.28)
Legitimate power 0.77 5.13 (0.81) 5.34 (0.99) 5.13 (1.00)
Reason-based trust – provider 0.73 4.33 (1.05) 4.65 (1.11) 4.62 (1.07)
Implicit trust – provider 0.82 4.32 (1.61) 3.89 (1.61) 4.05 (1.54)
Reason-based trust – users 0.77 3.36 (1.15) 3.93 (1.18) 4.25 (1.20)
Implicit trust – users 0.90 3.92 (1.79) 3.40 (1.84) 3.87 (1.62)
Undesirable customer behavior 2.83 (1.86) 3.46 (1.96) 3.10 (1.71)
Control variables
Environmental consciousness 0.91 5.71 (1.10) 6.01 (0.94) 5.88 (0.95)
Green consumerism 0.93 4.08 (1.30) 4.42 (1.30) 4.25 (1.23)
Risk seeking 0.84 3.71 (1.30) 3.82 (1.32) 3.60 (1.36)
Trustfulness 0.89 4.44 (1.22) 4.22 (1.33) 4.47 (1.51)
Notes: Means are not adjusted by control variables; the fact that participants are nearly equally distributed over conditions, indicates that the conditions of
the three collaborative consumption models were described with similar attraction leading to equally distributed selections
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0.17), are equally high in all models contradicting H2a, H2b
andH3b (Table II).
Undesirable customer behavior
To test whether undesirable customer behavior differs between
the models, an ANOVA including control variables was
conducted. The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant difference
between the collaborative consumption models concerning
undesirable customer behavior (F(2, 321) = 3.22, p = 0.04,
h2p = 0.02). Participants, who chose the service provided by a
company, were less likely to keep the car longer than
participants choosing the service from a peer.
Reasons for choosing a speciﬁc car sharingmodel
All 328 participants gave reasons for their decision in choosing
a car sharing service provided by either a company, a private
person or a community; from 121 participants, who decided for
the company, 182 different statements were gathered, from 102
participants, who selected the private person, 152 different
statements; and from 105 participants, who chose the
community, 165 different statements were assessed. These 499
statements were categorized in 15 different categories
(Appendix) by two independent raters resulting in a satisfying
Kappa = 0.63 [substantial agreement (Landis and Koch,
1977)]. Results[5] show that “law & safety” (15.9 per cent) and
“integrity & professionalism” (12.1 per cent) were the most
frequently reported reasons for choosing a company. When
choosing a private person, participants did so for reasons of
“law & safety” (13.8 per cent), “social contacts” (13.2 per cent)
and “complexity” (13.2 per cent). The most important reason
for engaging in a self-regulating community was “social
contacts” (33.3 per cent), followed by “complexity” (12.1
per cent).
To answer research question 4, whether the reasons for
choosing a speciﬁc collaborative consumption model differ, a
correspondence analysis was applied. The correspondence
analysis is a method that yields a graphical representation of the
associations between columns and rows of a contingency table
and thereby depicts the similarity of assignment proﬁles.
Concepts that are related to one another are closely related in
the ﬁgure of the correspondence analysis. The frequencies of all
categories, separated by the three providers of the service
(company; private person; community) were analyzed by
means of a correspondence analysis (Blasius, 2001), resulting
in a two-dimensional conﬁguration explaining 29.2 per cent of
the variance (Figure 3).
The ﬁrst dimension differentiates between safety/risk and
distance/closeness. Conﬁgured along the positive
hemisphere of the ﬁrst dimension are categories such as
“integrity & professionalism”, as well as “social conﬂict”,
Figure 3 Result of correspondence analysis of frequencies of associative categories by car sharing service provider of the car sharing service
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indicating that ideally, car sharing bears low risks if the
provider of the car is reliable, but can on the other hand lead
to social conﬂicts. In contrast, the categories “location of the
car” and “social contacts” were found on the negative
hemisphere of the ﬁrst dimension, expressing feelings of
closeness. On the second dimension, the different poles are
described by categories such as “location of the car”,
“availability” and “costs”, indicating that the second
dimension differentiates between time and spatial resources
and ﬁnancial resources.
Communities that provide car sharing services are located in
the negative hemisphere of the ﬁrst dimension and
characterized by the category “social contacts”. On the other
hand, a car sharing company, on the positive hemisphere of the
ﬁrst dimension, is located near the categories “dependency”,
“anonymity”, “availability”, “social conﬂicts” and “law and
safety”. Participants who chose a car sharing service provided
by a private person, did so for reasons of “ﬂexibility” and
“maintenance”.
Discussion
Existing research on why consumers engage in collaborative
consumption activities is rare, although this is a popular
consumer behavior (Möhlmann, 2015; Tussyadiah, 2015). We
aim to broaden the perspective by examining this customer-to-
customer interaction and investigating measures, i.e. power
and trust, to reduce undesirable customer behavior in different
collaborative consumption models (business-to-consumer,
peer-to-consumer, self-regulating community).
Both experimental studies show that as expected,
collaborative consumptionmodels differ according to measures
to reduce undesirable customer behavior (power and trust),
yet, as shown in the direct comparison in Study 2, some
characteristics are more prominently perceived. Compared to
self-regulating communities, companies organizing
collaborative consumption are perceived as punishing
freeriders, which is in line with earlier research showing that
surveillance and control mechanisms are welcomed in
business-to-consumer models in collaborative consumption
(research on car sharing companies, Bardhi and Eckhardt,
2012). Companies, especially service organizations, may use
penalties to prevent undesirable behaviors, for instance, by
applying fees for late payments (Kim, 2007). Regarding reward
power, differences occur only in Study 2. Consumers perceive
more rewards in peer-to-consumer models and self-regulating
communities than in companies. Nevertheless, the models are
similar regarding the wielding of legitimate power. An
explanation for the ascertained lack of difference in legitimate
power could be that all models can wield legitimate power, e.g.
by providing information via user-friendly websites (Umit
Kucuk and Krishnamurthy, 2007) or by justly applying
transparent rules (Jenny et al., 2007). Such information services
were not explicitly referred to in the scenarios, but participants
might have anticipated them. When communities are
organizing collaborative consumption, consumers must
sometimes interact with unknown and unfamiliar customers,
without the beneﬁt of companies that regulate the interactions
(Bin et al., 2004), which makes trust in the other users
particularly important (GermannMolz, 2013). In this vein, the
current research shows that reason-based trust in other users
gradually becomes higher in self-regulated communities than
when a peer or company provides a car-sharing service. In a
community where no regulating provider exists, people may
exploit the good or service if they feel others are overusing the
good (e.g. in household water consumption, Jorgensen et al.,
2009). Trust in others is therefore an important determinant of
cooperation not only in communities but also in peer-to-
consumer models where the power of the single peer is not as
potent as in business-to-consumermodels.
The consumer–provider relationship is perceived as very
different in collaborative consumption models: Business-to-
consumer relations are strongly characterized by a
service climate between the provider and its users. Generating a
service climate is important, and not only for companies
offering collaborative consumption services. This is in line with
research from conventional business-to-consumer relations,
high-quality service pays off for all kinds of organizations, as
consumers are more likely to remain customers of the company
(Dietz et al., 2004; Schneider et al., 1998; Sureshchandar et al.,
2002). In communities, collaborative consumption is
characterized by a conﬁdence climate among its members.
When goods are shared, consumers have to rely on the other
users of the goods, which generates a climate of trust, and
therefore a conﬁdence climate. The results concerning the
underlying customer–provider relationship suggest that the
strongest distinction between the two collaborative
consumption models is the prevalence of a service climate in
the business-to-consumer relation. Although the perception of
an antagonistic climate differs between the models, the effect
size was rather small compared to the service climate, and the
responses may show bottom effects; therefore, the effect is
negligible. The establishment of a positive interaction climate is
thus necessary to create a loyal customer base (cf.
Kandampully, 1998).
Qualitative data go hand in hand with the quantitative
ﬁndings. In the correspondence analysis, the ﬁrst dimension
describes safety/risk and distance/closeness going from the
company (safety/risk) through peer-to-consumer to the
community (distance/closeness). This indicates that coercive
power is associated speciﬁcally with companies (law and
safety), and that with peer-to-consumer (ﬂexibility, service)
and community (social contacts) the driving force is trust.
Nevertheless, the second dimension only differentiates between
features of the three providers, i.e. time and spatial resources/
ﬁnancial resources independently from the perception of power
and trust.
In the current research, we ﬁnd that collaborative
consumption models differ in perceptions of power and trust.
Nevertheless, consumers show similar undesirable behavior
when consumption is regulated by a community as well as by a
company. The behavior is slightly more undesirable with
private persons than with companies, which might be based on
the fact that with an individual, consumers believe it is easier to
discuss the late return of a car.
Implications, limitations and future research
Besides its merits, the study certainly holds some limitations;
ﬁrst, based on the slippery slope framework, we would expect
correlative relationships between behavior and power and trust,
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but due to the experimental approach, we do not test for this
relation and leave this to future research. Second, the
experimental design with its vignettes creates – as most
experiments do – a speciﬁc environment, but on the other
hand, they assure very high internal validity. In the current
study, we use real life examples when operationalizing.We have
tried to keep the vignettes as constant as possible, changing
only keywords guaranteeing high internal validity. The
keywords were taken from real life examples, which might
slightly reduce internal validity as they might lean towards
certain forms of power/trust. Additionally, we have collected
qualitative data backing up the results of the experiments.
These data produce similar ﬁndings but lack the causal effects
that are measured with the experiments. Third, the samples are
convenient samples comprised of younger people with rather
low incomes, but not in any way representative of the
population. Although this could be seen as a disadvantage, this
is actually one of the study’s strengths as young people with
higher education are the consumer group speciﬁcally interested
in car-sharing (Hamari et al., 2015; Piscicelli et al., 2015).
There seem to be two mechanisms to reduce undesirable
customer behavior. Coercive power decreases undesirable
costumer behavior in business-to-consumer models, whereas
communities and peer-to-consumer models ensure cooperative
behavior throughmutual trust. Based on the results, companies
offering collaborative use of goods are advised to have an
excellently functioning system of regulations to protect
consumers from undesirable customer behavior. In the car
sharing business this would mean guarding consumers from
users who, e.g. bring back the borrowed car late and/or messy,
or who reserve the car but then do not actually pick it up. Self-
regulating communities may attract consumers who would like
to use this form, for instance, via events where users of goods
can meet. On the one hand, consumers get to know the
companies themselves and implicit trust in the companies
emerges via regular events. The companies beneﬁt from this
implicit trust because a conﬁdence climate between companies
and consumers develops, and consumers feel an obligation to
cooperate, which diminishes costly monitoring and sanction
systems for defection. On the other hand, events give
consumers the opportunity to get to know other users and also
establish implicit trust in them. This again beneﬁts the
companies; they can reduce costly monitoring and sanction
systems, because consumers are aware that other users also feel
an obligation to cooperate.
In communities and peer-to-consumer models, it is essential
to establish mutual trust among the users of the collaborative
goods. Communities as well as peer-to-consumer models
therefore need to consider trust-building measures, for
instance, through increasing community identiﬁcation (Van
Vugt, 2001) or communication (Dyer and Chu, 2000). Thus,
regular meetings, face-to-face or virtually, are essential. In cases
where such meetings are impossible, other indicators of users’
trustworthiness are vital, e.g. reputation ratings and verbal
evaluations by other users, who are similar to the respective
consumer who needs to know about trustworthiness. If
communities want to attract those consumers who consider
companies offering collaborative goods to be more appealing,
then the communities need to introduce regulations that
protect these consumers from undesirable customer behavior.
Such sanctions can include, e.g. extra work for the community,
reduced access to the collaborative goods or exclusion from the
community.
The results of the current research hold valuable implications
not only for research but also for collaborative consumption
models. Findings indicate that the models differ according to
their measures to prevent undesirable customer behavior
(coercive power and consumers’ reason-based trust in other
users), and especially the perceived interaction climate. Thus,
different providers of collaborative consumption have two
different ways to prevent undesirable customer behavior.
Regulation is associated more with companies and trust in
fellow users is connected more to private persons and
communities.
Notes
1 In most countries, “car sharing” means the collective and
alternating utilization of cars. In the UK, the term “car
clubs” was used in the past. We stick with the common
terminology and use the expression “car sharing”
throughout the paper.
2 In the UK, “carpooling” is sometimes referred to as car
sharing. Nevertheless, in the current paper “car sharing” is
not used synonymously with “carpooling.”
3 For a robustness check, we undertook all analyses a second
time without the control variables environmental
consciousness, green consumerism, risk seeking and
trustfulness. These additional analyses conﬁrm the earlier
results and verify their robustness.
4 Again, for a robustness check, we have undertaken all
analyses a second time without control variables
environmental consciousness, green consumerism, risk
seeking and trustfulness. These additional analyses
conﬁrm the earlier results and verify their robustness.
5 Not taking into account the category others.
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Appendix. Vignettes
Study 1 vignettes for company/self-regulating
community
“Imagine you have decided to use a shared car from a car
sharing company/from your housing community for a small fee,
as have other people. For the company/community, it is im-
portant that the car is always returned on time and in good
condition. If you are often late or trash the car, it is possible
that the company even takes legal action against you/the commu-
nity even reacts negatively to you.
In order to facilitate the use of the car the company provides
a web platform where you can enter a request for the car, whereby
conditions of borrowing the car are difﬁcult to change/in the garage
of the house a list is posted where you can enter a request for the
car, whereby there are no conditions for borrowing the car.
In addition, the company/each member of the community ensures
that the car is serviced [regularly; only in the company version],
in order to assure that it runs properly.
For smooth proceedings, it is not necessary that you meet with
staff of the car sharing company (it is necessary that you meet with
the community regularly).”
Study 2 vignettes for company/peer-to-consumer/self-
regulating community
The community car of a car sharing company/a private person
who has posted the car on the internet/your housing community can
be used for a small fee, by you and other people, too.
For the company/the private person/the community, it is
important that the car is always returned on time and in good
condition.
Table AI Differences in service design in the three experimental conditions based on Goldstein et al. (2002)
Characteristics Company Private person Community
People Employees of company One private person Group of persons
Technology Internet platform to register for car Information via telephone to register
for car
List in garage to register for car
Processes Legal actions against undesirable
customer behavior
Changing conditions for borrowing
the car are difﬁcult
Car is serviced by the company
Exclusion from car in case of
undesirable customer behavior
Changing conditions for borrowing
the car are easy
Car is serviced by the private person
Negative reaction from group in case of
undesirable customer behavior
Conditions for borrowing the car do not
exist
Car is serviced by each group member
Physical facilities Not indicated Not indicated Garage in house
Equipment Car Car Car
Outcomes Driving car Driving car Driving car
Experiences Journey with a functioning car
No social interaction
Journey with a functioning car
Social interaction with private
person
Journey with a functioning car
Social interaction with group of persons
Table AII Descriptive categories in English and German language
No English German original German example
1 Maintenance, functionality of the car Wartung, Funktionstüchtigkeit des Autos “Auto wird immer gewartet”
2 Availability, selection of cars Verfügbarkeit, Auswahl an Autos “Auto zum gewünschten Termin verfügbar”
3 Flexibility Flexibilität “Flexible Rahmenbedingungen”
4 Integrity and professionalism Seriosität and Professionalität “Gute Organisation von professionellen Institutionen”
5 Location of the car Lage des Autos “kein Anfahrtsweg zum Auto”
6 Dependency Abhängigkeit “zu großes Abhängigkeitsverhältnis”
7 Costs Kosten “Ich nehme an, dass das am günstigsten ist”
8 Social conﬂicts soziale Konﬂikte “Risiko für Streit in der Hausgemeinschaft”
9 Law and safety Recht and Sicherheit “klare Vertragsverhältnisse”
10 Complexity Komplexität “unbürokratisch”
11 Responsibility Verantwortung “Wenig Eigenverantwortung”
12 Infrastructure Infrastruktur “telefonische Vereinbarung ist mir am sympathischsten”
13 Anonymity Anonymität “Car sharing ist unpersönlicher, deshalb angenehmer”
14 Social contacts respectively direct contact soziale Kontakte bzw. Direktkontakt “persönliche Beziehungen vorhanden”
15 Other Sonstiges
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If you are often late or dirty the car, it is possible that the company
even initiates legal action against you/private person even excludes you
from usage of the car/community reacts negatively to you.
To make it easier to use the car, the company provides an
internet platform, where you can enter your request for a car/you
can inform the private person of your request for a car via
telephone/a list is on display in the garage of the building in which
you can ﬁll in your requests for a car, whereby the conditions of
borrowing can be difﬁcult to change/the conditions of borrowing
can be changed unbureaucratically/conditions of borrowing do not
exist.
In addition, the company/private person committedly/each
member of the community ensures that the car is serviced regu-
larly, so it should//should always function/s properly.
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